First Round of the Presidential Elections in Colombia Winnows the Field to Santos and Zuluaga; the Question of Peace Negotiations Now Key
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In the months before the first round of Colombia’s presidential elections, incumbent Juan Manuel Santos of the Partido de “la U,” seemed headed for an easy victory, since his first term had benefited from steady economic growth, and he personally had gained popularity for initiating serious peace negotiations with the FARC guerrillas that have the potential to end 68 years of war in various guises. But as the election approached, accusations and scandals dominated the news and Santos’ main rival, Óscar Iván Zuluaga of the rightwing Centro Democrático, surged in the polls. Their differences are not particularly ideological; both men favor free-trade policies and believe in maintaining Colombia’s close relationship with the United States. The key to their standoff is the question of peace. Seen as the stand-in for former President Álvaro Uribe, who is now a Senator, Zuluaga (following Uribe’s lead) insists he will halt talks with the FARC if they do not surrender unconditionally, which most observers agree means the end of the process. In the first round Zuluaga edged out the President, with 29.2% to Santos’ 25.6% percent. And while the pro-peace leftist vote was spread out between Clara López of the Polo Democrático Alternativo and Enrique Peñalosa of the Partido Verde Colombiano, and many Conservatives lined up behind Marta Lucía Ramírez, most observers pointed to the significance of high rates of abstention and blank voting. Since no candidate won more than 50% of the vote, Santos and Zuluaga will go on to a runoff election on June 15.
Run Up to the Election
The MercoPress of Montevideo noted that the “Santos-Uribe rivalry turned the presidential campaign into a mudslinging contest.” There were accusations of bribes from drug traffickers, spying, and email hacking that “turned the election into an ugly slugfest” that “polarized a country trying to emerge from its violent past.” They argued that “much of the blame for the dirty campaigning” grew from the personal antagonism between President Santos and “his still-powerful predecessor, Álvaro Uribe.” “Despite presiding over what may be South America’s best-performing economy,” Santos struggled “amid relentless attacks by Uribe and his hand-picked heir, former finance chief Óscar Iván Zuluaga.” Yet in El Espectador of Bogotá Santiago Gamboa demonstrated why opposition to a return of Uribe’s influence is so strong. He asked, “how many young people must be killed and maimed” for Uribe to “calm his thirst for revenge”? “How many bodies must be shot and disfigured by shrapnel…how many young soldier amputees, how many farmers handicapped [by mines], how many children killed and families displaced, how many Colombians killed by Colombians?” Uribe insists that “the peace process is a ‘capitulation to terrorism,’” so he wants it canceled, so the military can win the war. But “one wonders why it will now be able to prevail after it failed to do so during his 8 years in office… one wonders what has changed”? While Uribe calls for “more sacrifices and pain,” not all Colombians like the “smell of death.” Hernando Gómez Buendía broke down the “anatomy of a smear campaign” in his examination of the scandals in Razónpublica of Bogotá. “In this swirl of news and reports” many people were clearly “confused” and “many people have decided their decision to vote or not to vote based on inaccurate or partial impressions.” Three of the five scandals dealt with Santos and drug traffickers, while two focused on Zuluaga, espionage and the peace negotiations. Much of the information coming out of both campaigns was based on “half truths or lies,” since both were trying very hard to muddy the waters. The “virulence” on both sides came from the high stakes involved, and to the “intense and destructive” nature of a fight between two groups “who worked many years together” and now see their struggle in apocalyptic terms.
Election Results Point to Unhappy and Disunified Voters
El Espectador of Bogotá noted that while only 3.5% separated Zuluaga and Santos, there were clear and sharp regional divisions. The Caribbean departments and the southwestern region of the country opted for the re-election of Santos, while in the center of the country, especially in Antioquia, Bogotá, and the coffee region, plus much of the eastern plains, voters leaned toward Zuluaga. The leftist Polo Democrático, with Clara López, showed that despite the challenges represented by the recent Mayor Petro ordeal, their stronghold remains Bogotá, and received 15.23%, and Conservative party candidate, Marta Lucía Ramírez, pulled in 15.52%. The slightly more surprising outcome was the fizzle of the Green Party’s vote (compared to four years ago) behind former mayor of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa, who only took 8.28% of the vote. But even more important was the 60% abstention rate, and the 6% of voters who voted blank in protest. In El Comerico of Quito Alfredo Negrete argued that to understand Colombia, one must explore its “two overlapping worlds.” The first is the country of economic, financial, and industrial prosperity, and the second “is steeped chronic violence,” where terrorism, kidnapping, and state-sponsored murder and disappearances have generated “resentment and desires for revenge” that have yet to dissipate.
Semana Magazine of Bogotá proclaimed that “abstention” was the “big winner of the presidential contest.” Presidential elections in Colombia have always been characterized by high abstention, which has historically hovered around 50%, but “the big surprise of the day was that it reached 60%,” the highest percentage since the 1994 elections, when abstention reached 66.23%. This is especially clear if you combine it with the blank vote (which normally ranges between 1% and 1.9%). In Razónpublica of Bogotá Juan David Velasco looked at the social coalitions that form the base of “Uribismo.” Despite the many scandals over the years (especially the “parapolítica” episode that linked Uribe and his supporter to death squads), “this political force remains an attractive option for many Colombians.” He identified “four different sectors who unconditionally support the ex-President Álvaro Uribe” (and therefore Óscar Iván Zuluaga): political caciques (and their political descendents) who started to lose their clout in the 1980s as they were marginalized by the political forces of democratization; the political “aristocrats” of the old powerful political families who shared “such values as respect for order and authority, the Catholic religion, a vision of the family as the central unit of society, and above all, love of the Fatherland;” landowners, especially in the coffee producing areas, “who are grateful” to Uribe for increasing their security and opening the highways back up; and the urban middle class of Bogotá and Medellín in particular, “whose electoral preference” is also for whoever can best push the button of “security,” and can be “tough” and give “zero concessions” to “criminals.”
Dramatic Showdown and Grudge Match in a Scramble for Votes as the Contest Comes Down to War or Peace
In the Buenos Aires Herald Patricio Navia stressed the personal nature of the coming election between the “arch-enemies.” In 2010, after two four-year terms, President Uribe had to step down when efforts to change the Constitution to allow a third term collapsed. “Reluctantly, Uribe threw his support behind his former defense minister Juan Manuel Santos.” While “they share market-friendly values and right-of-centre political views, Santos and Uribe have very different origins and trajectories. Whereas Santos belongs to a traditional, liberal, oligarchic family from Bogotá, Uribe comes from a landed upper middle-class family in Medellín. Santos is a worldly intellectual whereas Uribe is a no-nonsense intuitive politician. Santos is a consensus builder, whereas Uribe pushes forward in uncompromising ways.” There is no doubt that “Uribe was a very popular president,” and that Santos was “elected president mostly due to Uribe’s popularity.” So when Santos claimed he was “building on — rather than reformulating — Uribe’s democratic security policies,” and started peace talks with the FARC, the “fall-out with Uribe was instant,” and ever since “Colombian politics has revolved around the confrontations between the two men.” In fact, “Uribe seems obsessed with forcing Santos out of power,” yet “most analysts anticipate that Santos will prevail in the end.” Though Zuluaga’s success in the first round “has given him momentum,” for him to win “Uribe’s supporters will need to turn out in higher numbers than those who want to reject the former president’s effort to regain control of the Nariño presidential palace.” In Página/12 of Buenos Aires Katalina Vásquez Guzmán pointed to the “war to the death between the candidates.”
In Colombia Reports of Medellín Alexandra Jolly noted that Santos will focus on peace and Colombia’s poor. He said after the votes were counted that the run-off election will show the difference between “those who want the war to end and those who prefer a war without end.” Santos also reminded the supporters of Peñalosa and López that those who want a “more inclusive and balanced” Colombia “unite in the fight for peace.” Página/12 of Buenos Aires observed that Santos was quick to woo Conservatives, Polo voters, and Greens alike. El Espectador of Bogotá noted that Zuluaga had asked the Conservative Party’s Ramírez to accompany him in the second round. Marta Lucía Ramírez wrote in Semana Magazine of Bogotá that Conservatives were listening to both Santos and Zuluaga before making a decision, though most observers believe that they will ultimately lean toward Zuluaga.
And observers far and wide agree that the run-off election will hinge on the issue of peace negotiations. Álvaro Sierra Restrepo, Editor of Semana Magazine of Bogotá, noted that the peace process had entered a kind of limbo that now must be decided. In El Tiempo of Bogotá Fabio Martínez argued that now it’s a question of war or peace. The Buenos Aires Herald argued that the vote became “a plebiscite on President Santos’ strategy of negotiating disarmament of Marxist FARC rebels to end bloodshed that has killed some 200,000,” (a number, by the way, that is clearly a dramatic under-counting of all the people killed in the various interconnected struggles since 1946). La Jornada of Mexico City pointed to Santo’s claim that now it’s a choice between “an end to the war” or “war without end.” El Telégrafo of Guayaquil reported that peace will be the key issue in the final round of elections, and rounded up a plethora of talking heads saying just that. Vistazo Magazine of Ecuador wrote that Zuluaga had begun to hint that there could be some wiggle-room regarding prison time for FARC leaders (though his flirtations are not likely to sway). Panamá América of Panama City also noted that Zuluaga seemed to be changing his more hardcore positions on the FARC. In El Universal of Mexico City José Vales argued that the FARC wants to make peace, but not under Zuluaga (and the oligarquía’s) “humiliating” terms.
Of course, not everyone believes in peace. In El Universal of Caracas Antonio A. Herrera-Vaillant called negotiations with the FARC “a peace from Berchtesgaden.” He said that Santos’ choice “between the end of the war and a war without end” is a “pretty phrase” that “hides a great falsehood.” By breaking with long Colombian practice and giving the FARC belligerent status and equal standing with government forces, it is “a negotiation within the belly of the beast” of “hemispheric terrorism.” “It’s like negotiating a peace with Hitler in Berchtesgaden and a SS facilitator.”
What Will the Left Do?
…especially now that the blank vote is meaningless (or more likely, a vote for Zuluaga). In Colombia Reports of Medellín Daniel E Freeman wrote that many young voters in Colombia were surprised to learn that the blank vote, or protest vote, has no effect on the second round of a presidential election. “So what happens with the blank vote in the second round?” asked María after she heard the announcement that Santos and Zuluaga would face each other in the second round. Her friend, Zuka, replied promptly: “Nothing. Whoever gets the most votes now wins.”
“María’s face went blank when she heard the news of the vote. The 23-year-old from Bogotá was not the only one, however, to ask that question.” When it became clear that Colombia’s options for its next leader were narrowed down to Zuluaga and Santos, “Twitter and social media groups exploded with calls for voting blank in June 15′s second round of elections. These messages, dominated by the country’s youth, were filled with hopes that the power of the constitutionally guaranteed protest vote could wipe the ballot clean of the two presented candidates.” But the problem is, the blank vote does not have an effect on a second round.
At first it seemed, as Semana Magazine of Bogotá reported, that The Polo would call for its followers to vote blank, when “important party members privately expressed their inclination” in that direction. Yet other power players on the left quickly pushed back against such a suicidal temper tantrum. El Espectador of Bogotá quoted Antanas Mockus, former Mayor of Bogotá and the Green Party’s candidate four years ago, as saying “We will vote for Santos, without betraying our conscience.” Mockus formalized his support for President Santos in the second round because “we want to assert our right to peace.” He wrote that the left should “vote for Santos to give peace a chance.” “Let’s vote for Santos because the peace process he started is serious.” Semana Magazine noted that the issue of peace had allowed Santos to carry off “the unthinkable,” which was unite deposed Mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro and his Liberal Party replacement, Rafael Pardo, who both support Santos over Zuluaga. Colombia Reports indicated that the leftist Marcha Patriótica and Unión Patriótica parties had officially endorsed the reelection campaign of Juan Manuel Santos, due to his initiation and continued support of the peace process with the FARC underway in Havana.